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Abstract—Traceability and integrity are major challenges
for the increasingly complex supply chains of today’s world.
Although blockchain technology has the potential to address
these challenges through providing a tamper-proof audit trail
of supply chain events and data associated with a product life-
cycle, it does not solve the trust problem associated with the
data itself. Reputation systems are an effective approach to solve
this trust problem. However, current reputation systems are
not suited to the blockchain based supply chain applications as
they are based on limited observations, they lack granularity
and automation, and their overhead has not been explored.
In this work, we propose TrustChain, as a three-layered trust
management framework which uses a consortium blockchain
to track interactions among supply chain participants and to
dynamically assign trust and reputation scores based on these
interactions. The novelty of Trustchain stems from: (a) the
reputation model that evaluates the quality of commodities, and
the trustworthiness of entities based on multiple observations
of supply chain events, (b) its support for reputation scores
that separate between a supply chain participant and products,
enabling the assignment of product-specific reputations for the
same participant, (c) the use of smart contracts for transparent,
efficient, secure, and automated calculation of reputation scores,
and (d) its minimal overhead in terms of latency and throughput
when compared to a simple blockchain based supply chain model.
Index Terms—Trust Management Systems, supply chains,
permissioned blockchain, reputation
I. INTRODUCTION
BLockchain (BC) is a time-stamped series of immutabledata records which can enhance existing supply chains
with traceability, provenance, ownership information and anti-
counterfeiting. In BC-based supply chains, events such as
trade, ownership and location data are hashed and linked to BC
transactions. These transactions are grouped into blocks that
are linked together with cryptographic hashes, making them
immutable. The significance of the unsolicited confirmation
of supply chain events can be realised well in food supply
chains where there is a need to trace the origin of products,
or identify a point of fraud such as the horse meat scandal [1]
or the source of an outbreak such as the salmonella virus in
papayas [2]. In [3], the authors showed that a consortium per-
missioned BC can make otherwise siloed supply chain event
data available to all authorised participants making traceability
more robust and time efficient. However, the integrity of data
is identified as an unsolved problem for BC based supply
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Fig. 1. A typical food supply chain may involve producers, suppliers, logistics,
retailers, and regulators.
chains. In this paper, we use food the supply chain as a
representative supply chain application example as in [3] but
note that the presented framework can be generalized to other
supply chains. Figure 1 depicts the supply chain of a food
product starting from the primary producer to the retailer.
Most conventional BCs are based on the creation and
transfer of digital assets. In these applications, BC provides
not only immutability but also a proof that the stored data is
correct and trusted. This feature is a result of the integration
of creation and transfer of digital values with the distributed
consensus mechanisms based on public key cryptography and
digital signatures. For example, in Bitcoin BC, creation and
transfer of bitcoins is integrated to the Proof of Work (POW)
consensus mechanism. However, for physical commodity and
asset trading applications, the hashed data on the BC repre-
sents digital observations of physical events. Although data
related to supply chain events is immutable once recorded on
a BC, the BC cannot ascertain the authenticity of observations
provided by supply chain entities. The authenticity and trust
of the data becomes questionable, and thus raises the concern
of data integrity on the BC.
In this paper, we argue that despite BC being an effective
technology for managing supply chain traceability, it alone
cannot support the trust and reliability of data regarding the
quality of commodities and the trustworthiness of supply chain
entities. False data generated by the supply chain entities
becomes immutable once recorded on the BC. One approach
to improve the trust and reliability of the data is to use
accountability and reward mechanisms to penalise and in-
centivise dishonest and trustworthy participants, respectively.
These mechanisms rely on a trust management system (widely
used in e-commerce, distributed systems) which we propose to
integrate within a supply chain BC. Such a system may also
benefit from the data generated by Internet of Thing (IoT)
sensors (e.g. temperature, location) which are being increas-
ingly embedded in various stages of the supply chain life-
cycle (e.g. farms, manufacturing plants, shipping containers)
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[4], [5]. However, IoT sensors are also susceptible to faults
or malicious attacks and thus cannot be blindly trusted. Apart
from IoT sensors, there are other observations contributing to
trust in the real world, such as food authority approvals, the
brand perception of a seller in a food market, etc. Moreover,
current approaches for trust management either attribute the
reputation to the entities (i.e., agent-based) or to the asset
(i.e., resource-based) [6]. However, a supply chain entity (e.g.
a supplier) may be simultaneously involved in the trade of
multiple products, where reputation for each type of product
becomes necessary. Supply chain applications demand more
flexibility and granularity as we not only need to trust both
the entities and the commodities, but also the entity within
one particular product supply chain. Finally, the integration
of the trust management system within the BC-based supply
chain framework should introduce minimal overheads to the
latency, throughput and resource consumption. In summary,
some challenges to devise an effective reputation system in
supply chains are: (a) the need for a multi-faceted assessment
of the trustworthiness of the data logged in the BC which
incorporates inputs from IoT sensors, feedback provided by
supply chain entites, physical audits, etc. (b) a supply chain
participant may trade more than one type of commodities; a
participant must be evaluated distinctively for each of these
types and so should be the individual commodity based on
whether its quality was preserved during the product chain, (c)
to action the penalties and incentives, an automated framework
is required which not only provides traceability of supply chain
events but also relates each of these events to a trust value
of a participant and the quality of commodity, and (d) the
associated overheads should be minimal and not impact the
scalability of the platform.
To address the above challenges, we propose a three-layered
BC-based trust management framework called TrustChain
which makes the following novel contributions:
1) A BC based reputation and trust framework for supply
chains that operates at both agent and resource level
and evaluates the truthfulness of data based on multiple
sources of data. The framework offers flexibility to
compute the reputation at different levels of abstractions
ranging from the product to a particular supply chain
entity and even the role of this entity in the supply chain
of a specific product.
2) We leverage smart contracts for automation of reputation
calculation with BC transactions and penalties to action
the rewards and accountability for both supply chain
participants and quality of food product being traded.
Based on the output of the smart contracts, supply chain
participants and commodities receive reputation scores
as a measure of their trustworthiness for a trade event.
Supply chain participants are then penalised by revoking
their participation in the supply chain or rewarded by
getting high ratings published.
3) We develop a complete implementation of TrustChain
using Hyperledger Fabric. Our evaluations reveal that
the mechanisms introduced by our framework add min-
imal overheads in terms of throughput and latency in
comparison to a trading model that does not incorporate
a trust management system on BC. We also perform a
qualitative security analysis of TrustChain’s resilience to
known attacks against reputation systems.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section II
includes related work followed by the TrustChain’s framework
in Section III. Security analysis and performance evaluation is
presented in Section IV and conclusion in Section V.
II. RELATED WORK
In [7] the authors proposed a novel model for Emission
Trading Scheme (ETS) which incorporates BC technology
with reputation-based trading to address fraud and manage-
ment issues in ETS. The system’s efficacy is improved by
the reputation-based market segmentation and priority-value-
order mechanisms, which allow sellers with high reputations
to access more and better offers from buyers, and also to sort
offers based on reputation and price. However their approach
is not granular as the sellers with different approaches to
emission reduction schemes are always grouped together.
Additionally, reputations of these sellers are drawn from only
the observations of auditing bodies, which may not be as
frequent as the trade transactions. As the reputations may
not get updated frequently, this may favor the same group
of sellers by always giving them access to higher bids, and
may introduce bias in the selection of buyers.
The authors in [6] propose a BC based reputation system to
ensure the data credibility of vehicular systems. A temporary
center node among a cluster of vehicles is selected to generate
ratings for nearby vehicles. Then, the vehicles in the cluster
form a consensus for these vehicle ratings before they are
stored on the BC. This results in a large number of messages
associated with the proposed consensus mechanism to update
the reputation of vehicles. The performance of the proposed
BC based approach is compared to a scheme, where the ratings
are verified by the vehicles by using message hashes without
a consensus. They analyse the performance of the system by
introducing malicious vehicles and argue that using consensus
for verifying the ratings is a better approach when there are
malicious ratings generated by untrusted vehicles. However,
the additional cost of the BC system, in terms of latency for
reaching the consensus, is not evaluated.
Another promising approach for trustless, privacy preserv-
ing resource based reputation system is presented in [8]. Their
approach highlights the benefits of anonymous rating of assets
by preserving the privacy of consumers. However, without
a performance analysis, it is hard to evaluate the overall
competence of token generation, which is used by consumers
to generate decoupled ratings from transactions. Also, in case
of unfair ratings, some ratees would be disadvantaged as there
is no direct link between a transaction and a rater which
eventually can be exploited by malicious users.
In [9], a trust model is proposed in the context of au-
tonomous wireless sensor networks, where the nodes must
maintain a minimum trust level to keep participating in the net-
work and avoid revocation. However, the proposed approach
works on the network node level only and lacks granularity
as a node may provide more than one service and must
be evaluated for its trustworthiness accordingly. Moreover,
the messages used for reputation calculations are verified by
their message digests, which is the only criterion of message
authentication.
Recently, IBM [4] researchers have been developing crypto-
anchors, tamper-proof digital fingerprints, which can be em-
bedded into products and linked to a BC as a proof of
product’s identity. The input from crypto-anchors could be
readily integrated in TrustChain and can potentially address
the problem of counterfeiting, specially in pharmaceuticals and
high-value assets. However, it would be interesting to note the
cost analysis as it may be a limiting factor for the adoption of
the technology in supply chains.
In summary, the existing reputation systems for BCs are
either asset-based or agent-based and fail to provide the
level of granularity required by supply chain applications.
Furthermore, the reputations are mostly sourced from single
points of observations. There is also a lack of consideration of
adversarial models and a quantitative analysis of the overheads
associated with the introduction of the trust model. TrustChain
is designed considering the aforementioned challenges and
takes into account the multiple data observations, automation
of rating calculations, accountability mechanisms, a detailed
security analysis and performance analysis in terms of network
throughput and latency.
III. REPUTATION AND TRUST IN BC BASED SUPPLY
CHAINS
As discussed in Section I, traceability and integrity are
major challenges faced by supply chain management systems.
There are two basic requirements for providing traceability
and integrity in supply chains: (1) the data that provides
traceability and integrity of supply chain events, product data
stating its properties, IoT sensor data and other supplemen-
tary sources of data (such as crypto-anchors) and regulatory
endorsements should be recorded in a tamper-proof way, (2)
the recorded data should be authentic and should represent
the true observations of sensor devices, supply chain entities,
and other data sources. The BC technology satisfies the first
requirement with a distributed tamper-proof ledger. The aim
of our work is to address the second requirement by devising
mechanisms to establish trust in data at the point of origin and
ensure that the data recorded on the BC is trusted. As supply
chains involve multiple entities and product types, the trust
should be established at a granular level that takes into account
the different product types, the entities, and their interactions.
Furthermore, the process can be automated providing real-
time traceability. To achieve this aim, our proposed frame-
work called TrustChain proposes a BC integrated trust and
reputation module that evaluates the truthfulness of the supply
chain data and calculates reputation scores for commodities
and supply chain entities at a granular level. To automate the
Fig. 2. Three-layered structure of the TrustChain framework
process, we employ smart contracts, which are self executing
software programs invoked when predefined conditions are
met.
TrustChain framework is organized into three layers: data,
BC and application with supporting components as shown
in Figure 2. The data layer encompasses supply chain data
produced by sensor devices, trade events between entities,
and regulatory endorsements. The raw data can be stored in
a database at the application layer (i.e., off-the-chain), while
the message digest of the data is sent to the BC layer in
the form of transactions. At the BC layer, the transactions
are stored on the ledger and processed following a set of
access rules defined by the Access Control List (ACL). The
access rules specify who can read or write the data on
the ledger. The transactions invoke smart contracts, which
generate reputation and trust values for entities and quality
ratings for commodities using the reputation and trust module.
The smart contracts also emit warning events depending on
predefined conditions (e.g., when a frozen product is stored
above 0 degree). The reputation and trust values are stored on
the digital profiles of supply chain entities and commodities
on the BC. Finally, the application layer interacts with the BC
layer through queries. The administrators and regulators query
about the trust and quality scores of entities and commodities
respectively. The quality of commodity is also made available
to the consumer when it finishes the product chain. Based on
the retrieved scores, they action rewards and penalties, which
recompense the entities with high scores by publishing their
scores, penalizes the entities with low scores by revocation
from the network, and publishes the product ratings for final
consumers.
We implement TrustChain on a BC as a service platform,
where the permissioned BC network is managed by a business
network administrator sitting between the supply chain entities
and the BC network. The business network administrator has
administrative control over the BC and defines the business
network model. We choose Hyperledger Fabric [10] for the
deployment due to its support for business related applications,
ease of deployment, and availability of tools for BC deploy-
ment, management, data query, smart contract implementation,
and cross organisational collaboration. Note that, TrustChain
can also be implemented on a Hyperledger Fabric based multi-
organisation blockchain network1 owned by a consortium of
supply chain entities rather than using a BC as a service
platform.
We assume that the entities maintain a static public key in
order to be identified in the business network. When an entity
submits a query/write transaction, the validating peers verify
the transaction does not violate the ACL rules (see Figure 3).
In the following sections, we describe the layers of the
TrustChain framework in detail.
A. Data Layer
As shown in Figure 2, the data layer has inputs from sensor
data streams, trade events, and regulatory endorsements. Based
on these inputs, the data layer generates transactions for the
BC layer. For scalability, the raw data collected at the data
layer can be stored in a database (i.e. off-the-chain) rather
than being stored in the BC.
Sensor data streams: We assume that each supply chain
entity from the primary producer to the retailer, as shown in
Figure 2, has IoT sensors installed to monitor temperature,
location, humidity, etc. These sensor readings can be used as
an indicator of the quality of the food products. In order to
ensure the accuracy of reported readings, we further assume
that these IoT sensors are calibrated periodically. In this paper,
we use temperature sensors as an example. We assume that
the commodity must be stored within a certain temperature
range (max and min thresholds) at all times from its origin
to the retailer’s shelf. Based on the temperature readings,
the commodity is given a rating, denoted by Repsens(t).
Moreover, warning messages can be generated if the reported
sensor temperature is out of bounds of the desired range. The
conditions for commodity rating and warning messages are
specified in the smart contract related to the commodity (to
be discussed in Section III-B2).
Trade events: In our previous work [3], authors defined
a trade event as a change of ownership of a commodity,
which is stored on the BC. In Trustchain, in addition to the
change of ownership, a rating, Reptrader(t), attributed by the
buyer for the seller is appended to the BC. The rating is
based on a quality assessment of the traded commodity, which
is carried out on pre-negotiated terms between the trading
parties, such as the use of crypto-anchors [4] or acceptance
sampling [11] at the buyer’s end. These quality assessment
conditions are specified in the smart contract (see Section
III-B2). The assessment by the buyer incentivises the seller
to trade honestly, and both trading parties would benefit from
1https://hyperledger.github.io/composer/v0.19/tutorials/deploy-to-fabric-
multi-org
Fig. 3. ACL defines the rules of access to the resources of the TrustChain
the honest trade. However, a buyer may intentionally generate
a false rating for a seller which is termed in TrustChain as
“unfair rating” and dealt using a “dissatisfaction flag” which
can be issued by the seller. This is discussed further in Section
IV-A.
Regulatory endorsements: Regulatory endorsements are
generated by food safety authorities performing physical on-
site checks on production, storage/cooling, and transportation
facilities, or the HACCP (Hazard Analysis and Critical Control
Points) checks [3] to approve the quality conditions. Regula-
tory ratings, Repreg(t), are generated based on the regulatory
endorsement data in the forms of certificates and reports.
All the ratings are generated using transactions and smart
contracts explained in the next section. The generated ratings
Repsens(t), Reptrader(t), and Repreg(t) at time t are sent to
the BC layer to be used by the trust and reputation module
to calculate reputation and trust values for the supply chain
entities and commodities.
B. BC Layer
Transactions in TrustChain are governed by an ACL. Figure
3 presents the TrustChain ACL, which defines the permissions
for submitting transactions, read/write access to the ledger,
updating profiles, and other actions for the supply chain
entities. The BC layer maintains the digital profiles for all
supply chain entities and commodities as shown in Figure
2. These digital profiles are mapped to the entities and the
commodities using the enrolment ID of the certificates issued
by a certification authority. TrustChain ACL does not give
the entities the permission to modify their digital profiles
(see Figure 3). Next, to automate the reputation calculation,
smart contracts are invoked by transactions received from the
data layer. The following sections present the transactions, the
smart contracts, and the reputation and trust module of the BC
layer in detail.
1) Transactions: We adopt our transaction vocabulary from
[3] and categorize the transactions based on the layer invoking
them. This section describes the transactions invoked at the
data layer which records supply chain events (eg. existence
of a new commodity), change in the state of the entities (eg.
reputation of a trader) and the commodities (eg. change of
ownership) on the ledger. Transactions at the data layer include
the create transaction (TXcr), the trade transaction (TXtr),
the sensory transaction (TXsens), the regulator transaction
(TXReg), and the receipt of commodity transaction (TXrec)
with their details as follows:
A ledger that stores information pertaining to any particular
commodity starts with a create transaction TXcr, which is
issued by a primary producer to confirm the existence of a
new commodity and identify the quality smart contract this
commodity will be bound to. A quality contract specifies
pre-negotiated terms and conditions regarding the quality
assessment, max/min temperature bounds, rating criterion etc.
The TXcr is given by:
TXcr = [CID|Hdata|IDo|IDcontract|Sigo|PUo] (1)
where CID is the identifier of the commodity, Hdata is the
hash of the commodity data (e.g. commodity type, quantity,
unit price, etc.), IDo is the commodity owner’s identifier
(i.e. the primary producer), and IDcontract is the identifier
of quality contract the commodity is bound to. Sigo and PUo
are the signature and the public key of the commodity owner.
After a commodity is created by the primary producer, it can
be traded between different supply chain entities as it makes
it way to the retail shelf (see Figure 1). The trade transaction
confirms the physical handover of a commodity from the seller
to the buyer:
TXtr = [CID|Hdata|IDb|Sigs|PUs|Sigb|PUb] (2)
where CID and Hdata are similar to TXcr, and IDo is
replaced with IDb, the identifier of the buyer. Sigs, PUs,
Sigb, and PUb are the signatures and the public keys of the
seller, and the buyer, respectively.
As the commodity gets registered using TXcr, IoT devices
monitoring the temperature information of a commodity can
log the temperature related data on the BC using sensory
transactions, TXsens. These transactions are generated by the
gateway nodes identified by device IDs as IoT sensors have
typically low computational capabilities. It is important to note
that the generation rate of this transaction is decoupled from
the rate at which the commodity is actually traded. This is
to ensure that the commodity is being monitored at regular
intervals while it is in storage, prior to a trade event. A sensory
transaction is given by:
TXsens = [CID|Hdata|Sigdevice] (3)
where CID is the identifier of the commodity, Hdata is the
hash of the IoT sensor stream, and Sigdevice is the signature
of the gateway node generating the sensory transactions.
The regulator in TrustChain is assumed to be a regional
authority enforcing food safety standards such as Food Stan-
dards Australia New Zealand (FSANZ) [12]. As described in
Section III-A, after a physical inspection of a storage site,
the regulator issues a rating for the seller, Repreg(t) via the
regulator transaction TXReg given by:
TXReg = [IDs|Hdata|Ctype] (4)
where IDs is the seller’s identifier, Hdata is the hash of the in-
spection evidence, and Ctype specifies the type of commodity
for which the score is issued. This ensures that the regulator’s
ratings are distinctively recorded for each type of commodity
as the storage conditions and assessing bodies may differ for
different types of commodity trade. Also, to ensure compliance
with the quality and safety standards, it is important for the
regulator to perform periodic checks on the site and issue
updated ratings. Note that, these on-site inspections are not
frequent. If the site has not been inspected by the regulator
after a certain time period, i.e. the regulator’s rating has an
older timestamp than a certain inspection period, the weight
of the regulator’s rating is reduced so that the rating and trust
module fairly gives more weight to other observations which
are more current.
Upon receipt of a commodity at the retailer’s end, the receipt
of commodity transaction TXrec is generated to log the end
of product chain on BC.
TXrec = [CID|Sigr|PUr] (5)
where CID is the identifier of the received commodity at
the retailer, Sigr and PUr are the signature and the public
key of the receiving retailer. The purpose of introducing this
transaction is twofold: (1) for security purposes, it is important
to keep track of commodities completing the product chain as
the commodities with no progressive chains may be indicated
as fake, and (2) it invokes the quality smart contract (See
Section III-B2) and updates the overall rating Repsens(t) of
the commodity throughout the product chain which can be
made visible to the consumers via the application layer.
2) Smart Contracts: As discussed in Section III-B1, we
use smart contracts in TrustChain for the calculation of ratings
for entities and commodities when transactions pertaining to a
supply chain event are recorded on BC. Using smart contracts,
these ratings are calculated in a transparent, secure, efficient,
and automated way, eliminating the need for any intermedi-
aries. Together with the rewards and penalties mechanisms
at the application layer, the ratings calculated by the smart
contracts incentivise supply chain entities to contribute only
trustworthy data to the network.
The smart contracts in Hyperledger are installed by the
business network administrators or a subgroup of an orga-
nization. In case of multiple organizations, Message Service
Provider (particular to Hyperledger) defines the local access
rights for installing the smart contracts. More information
on administrative access can be found in [10]. Figure 4
depicts how these contracts contribute to the ratings of the
commodities and traders with respect to a trade event on the
supply chain.
Quality Contract: A quality contract is installed on
TrustChain for every supply chain commodity. The contract
enlists the quality rating criteria, i.e. temperature thresholds for
the commodity, along with the contract identifier, IDcontract.
The quality contract categorizes temperature thresholds as: (1)
boundary thresholds (the maximum upper and lower bounds of
the required temperature in which the commodity is considered
safe), (2) damage thresholds (temperature thresholds exceed-
ing which results in complete spoilage of the commodity).
The quality contract is instantiated when a primary producer
issues TXcr, which binds the created commodity to the
Fig. 4. Reputation calculation of seller using quality and rating contract
quality smart contract. The inputs to the quality contract are
the temperature readings submitted by TXsens. Based on
the temperature inputs and the temperature bounds defined
in the contract, the quality contract generates two types of
outputs: the warning notifications, and the reputation score
of the commodity. The warning notifications are alerts for the
commodity owner and issued when the temperature reading in
TXsens reaches the damage thresholds. The reputation score
of the commodity Repsens(t), is invoked as a result of a
trade transaction, TXtr, and is used by the rating contract
to compute the reputation of the seller as shown in Figure 4.
The quality contract generates Repsens(t) based on the tem-
perature history of the commodity. If the temperature bounds
defined in the contract are not violated, a maximum score
is assigned to the commodity, whereas when the temperature
readings indicate a damage, the respective score is reduced.
The reputation score is updated with each trade event as the
commodity moves through the product chain till it reaches the
final retailer. When a commodity’s product chain has n trade
transactions, we store the corresponding commodity reputation
scores in the commodity’s profile by generating Repsens:
Repsens = [Repsens(t0), Repsens(t1), ....., Repsens(tn−1)]
(6)
When the commodity reaches the final retailer, the retailer
generates TXrec, which invokes the quality contract to gen-
erate the overall commodity rating, Rsens. This quality rating
can be encoded on a QR code to be used by the retailer.
Rating Contract: For a trade event between a buyer and
a seller happening at time t, the rating contract is invoked to
compute the reputation of the seller Repseller(t) from three in-
puts: (1) reputation score of the traded commodity Repsens(t),
(2) the regulator’s rating for the seller Repreg(t), and (3) the
buyer’s rating for the seller Reptrader(t). Repseller(t) can be
computed as a weighted sum:
Repseller = w1 ×Repsens(t) + w2 ×Reptrader(t)+
w3 ×Repreg(t) (7)
where w1, w2, and w3 are the weighting factors for the
reputation components. The choice of the weighting factors
depends on the supply chain characteristics. For example, if
the sensor data is infrequent, less weight can be given to
Repsens(t). The values of the weighting factors are chosen
by the consortium members, and implemented by the business
network administrator during network initialization. Moreover,
the weights can be adjusted based on the available information
(e.g., if a regulator rating is outdated, w3 can be reduced). The
overall reputation scores of a seller for each type of commodity
are aggregated over a time period using the reputation and trust
module described in the next section.
3) Reputation and Trust Module: Once the reputation
scores are calculated by the smart contracts, a reputation
model can be chosen based on an aggregation function (mean,
median, or beta-reputation [13]). For TrustChain, we consider
the reputation and trust management proposed by [9]. Based
on Gambetta’s definition of trust [14], we adopt a time-varying
and amnesic trust score calculation that adapts to supply chain
events, where the recent events are given higher weights than
the older events.
When a trader joins the supply chain network for the first
time at time t′, it has no past reputation to compute the trust
score Ttrader(t′). Thus, the initial trust score assigned to the
trader is Ttrader(t′) = Trustmin, which is the minimum trust
score that each entity should maintain to keep participating
in the TrustChain network. After initialization, the trust score
of the trader is updated by the reputation and trust module.
The calculation of the trust score involves two steps: (1)
calculating the overall reputation score of the trader based on
the current and previous reputation scores, and (2) calculating
the trust score based on the overall reputation score and other
application-specific features.
To calculate the overall reputation score R(tn) for a trader
at time tn, we consider the reputation scores corresponding
to the current and previous supply chain events Repseller(t0),
Repseller(t1), , ...., Repseller(tn) as:
R(tn) =
t=tn∑
t=t0
Repseller(t)× β(tn − t) (8)
where Repseller(t0) is the initial reputation score of the trader,
and Repseller(t) is the reputation score of the trader corre-
sponding to the supply chain event happening at time t with
the corresponding forgetting factor β(tn − t). The forgetting
factor β(t) is a decaying function (e.g. β(t) = e−f(t) ), which
enables the overall reputation score to evolve in time. Thus,
the effect of the recent events in supply chain dominates the
events happened earlier in time. Note that R(tn) is the overall
reputation of a trader for trading a single type of commodity.
For a trader trading multiple types of commodities, this score is
calculated for each type of commodity, and stored in the profile
of the trader separately to provide granularity. The reputation
of the trader can be calculated on a periodic basis, where the
period is defined by the network business administrator or the
consortium of administrators defining the business model.
4) Trust Evaluation: Recall from the previous section
that every trader should maintain the minimum trust level
Trustmin to participate in TrustChain. However, this trust
value must be updated with increasing/decreasing reputation
of a seller. Also, apart from the reputation score based on the
ratings of buyers, commodities, and regulators, there may be
other application-specific features affecting the trust score of a
trader (e.g., number/volume of sales, consumer feedback for a
retailer or commodity, etc.). Thus, we calculate the trust score
of a trader Ttrader(tn) based on the overall reputation R(tn)
and some other feature scores f1, f2, ..., fN as:
Ttrader(tn) = α0.R(tn) + α1.f1 + α2.f2 + ...+ αN .fN (9)
where α0, α1,..., and αN are the weighting factors determined
by the business network administrator. As an example, let us
consider the number of successful transactions a trader has
completed as a feature to be used in the trust score. As an
illustrative example, the business network administrator can
assign the score for this feature shown by the Table I. Similar
to the reputation score calculation, a forgetting factor can be
applied for the other feature scores.
TABLE I
TRUST FEATURE AND FEATURE SCORE
Number of Successful
Transactions Feature Score (f1)
0 -1
1-3 0.5
4-6 1.5
>= 6 2
The trust scores calculated by the trust and reputation mod-
ule are stored in the profiles of the traders. When Ttrader(tn)
<Trustmin, a notification message is generated to inform
the network administrator about the trust level violation.
Upon receiving the notification, the network administrator can
revoke the trader from participating in the network.
C. Application Layer:
The main function of the application layer is to address
queries and transaction requests from administrators, regula-
tors and consumers. Based on the query results and the role of
the issuing authority, penalties and rewards are implemented
by the application layer.
1) Queries: The queries issued at the application layer
include transactions to read/write and read only from BC.
The read/write query transactions read the data from the
ledger first, and then perform some computations on that
data. For example, Ttrader(tn) is computed and stored in
the seller’s profile, after reading the reputation R(tn) of
the seller and other features described in the reputation and
trust module. Note that, with every TXtr, the rating smart
contract automatically computes Repseller(tn). However, it
would be cumbersome to compute R(tn) for every seller
due to the significant delay it would cause on the validating
peer’s end. The network administrator can issue a transaction
to request the reputation and trust module to calculate the
overall reputation of a trader R(tn) over a certain period
of time. Note that when R(tn) is calculated, the respective
trust score, Ttrader(tn), is also computed by the TrustChain
implementation and the values are stored in the profiles of the
entities.
The read query transactions, on the other hand, read data
from the ledger and return the results to the application layer.
For example, an end consumer can request the rating generated
from sensor data stream Repsens(t) for a commodity through
its product chain. Other read query transactions can be gen-
erated for the properties of the commodities and the traders
i.e. the traders with highest number of trades, the transactions
with complete or incomplete product chains, commodities with
high reputation scores etc.
2) Rewards: Supply chain entities, which trade honestly,
should be incentivised to keep trading honestly. Thus, we in-
troduce “publishing the entities with highest trust values on the
network” as a reward mechanism [7]. Network administrators
can publish the entities with high trust scores periodically,
which would help the honest entities to find new customers
and increase their sales.
3) Penalties: The trust scores can also be used to penalize
the entities with low scores, which do not trade honestly.
The network administrator can penalise entities by revoking
the entities from participating in the network for a certain
period of time by invoking the TXrevoke transaction, which
updates the participation status of the entities in their profiles.
Also, the network administrator can publish the list of revoked
participants on the network for discouraging the other supply
chain entities to contribute dishonestly. After the penalty pe-
riod, the administrator resumes the participation of the entities
with the TXresume transaction, which reverses back the the
participation status of the entities. TXrevoke and TXresume
transactions are the only write transactions on the application
layer.
IV. EVALUATION AND RESULTS
In this section we provide a qualitative security and privacy
analysis, a proof of concept implementation and a quantitative
performance evaluation of the TrustChain framework.
A. Security and Privacy Analysis
In this section, we discuss the known attacks in reputation
systems and TrustChain’s ability to defend against them.
Regulators, business network administrators, and Hyperledger
peers are considered to be honest, and excluded from the
threat model of TrustChain. Hyperledger endorsing peers are
excluded from threat model as any transaction maliciously
endorsed by one peer eventually gets checked by all the
validating peers before it is committed to the ledger. Thus,
due to BC’s endorsement policies and consensus mechanisms,
It is highly unlikely for the malicious peer to get successful.
Recall that TrustChain aims to solve the supply chain trust
problem associated with the quality of commodities and the
entities logging data on the blockchain. Thus, adversaries in
our threat model include supply chain entities who are able to,
individually or in collusion with the other supply chain entities,
fake the data source by: modifying sensor feeds, creating false
commodities, registering with multiple IDs, generating false
ratings for other supply chain entities, masquerading as another
identity, and not acknowledging of trade events; all to earn
high ratings on the network dishonestly. Table II summarizes
these attacks and explains various mechanisms incorporated
in TrustChain to protect against them. Note that, in Table II
we only consider the attacks against reputation systems and
exclude network attacks in general. Based on the European
Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) risk analysis
criteria [15], we also analyse the likelihood of the occurrence
of these attacks and TrustChain’s resilience against them.
TrustChain exhibits high resilience against eight out of the
nine attacks, and moderate resilience against the remaining
attack considered in Table II. We briefly explain here the
problem of unfair ratings (see section III-B1), for which
the seller can issue a “dissatisfaction flag” for the dishonest
buyer based on the proof needed to evaluate the quality.
The flag message is sent to a validator who recalculates the
Repseller. However, this could result in an incessant loop if the
seller always issues a dissatisfaction flag for the honest buyer
deliberately. The validator can resolve this by reducing the
weight of the buyer’s rating w2, and re-evaluating Repseller if:
(i) multiple sellers have raised dissatisfaction flags for the same
buyer, and (ii) the number of the consecutive dissatisfaction
flags raised by the seller for the buyer is less than the number
of trade transactions between them. These conditions indicate
that the seller’s dissatisfaction flags are genuine.
B. Proof of Concept Implementation
A proof of concept implementation of TrustChain has been
developed using Hyperledger Composer2, which is a high-
level tool that facilitates building and running applications on
top of the Hyperledger Fabric platform. For the implementa-
tion, we have modelled a business network on Hyperledger
Composer for commodity trading among three supply chain
entities: primary producer, shipper and a retailer following the
transactional vocabulary described in Section III. To submit
transactions and queries to the deployed blockchain business
network, we have used the REST APIs. The end-to-end com-
modity trade in the TrustChain implementation is described
by the folowing steps:
1) An instance of the quality contract is created for the
commodity with the temperature conditions specific to
the type of the commodity.
2https://www.hyperledger.org/projects/composer
2) The supply chain entities register on the network and
are assigned initial trust scores Trustmin.
3) As discussed in Section III-B1, when the commodity
is ready for trade, the primary producer generates the
TXcr which is bound to the ID of the quality smart
contract IDcontract, and also assigns CID to the com-
modity.
4) Once the TXcr is committed in the ledger, TXsens
transactions indicating the temperature conditions of the
commodity are stored on BC and alerts are generated if
the temperature readings exceed the thresholds defined
in the contract.
5) The primary producer’s storage facility is periodically
assessed by the regulator and the respective Repreg(t)
is stored in the primary producer’s profile.
6) The transaction TXtr is created for the commodity trade
between the primary producer and the shipper, who
becomes the new owner of the commodity. The shipper
gives the rating Reptrader(t) to the primary producer
based on the quality of the received commodity.
7) The transaction TXtr triggers the rating smart contract
which computes Repsens(t) and the primary producer’s
rating Rseller, and stores them in the commodity’s and
the primary producer’s profiles, respectively.
8) The steps 5-7 are repeated for the trade between the
shipper and the retailer by replacing the primary pro-
ducer and the shipper with the shipper and the retailer,
respectively. The retailer is the final buyer of the com-
modity.
9) Finally, the retailer issues TXrec which also generates
the commodity rating using the quality smart contract.
10) Steps 1-9 are repeated for other commodities of the same
type for a trade event happening at time t, and a seller
has [Repseller(tn), Repseller(tn−1), ..., Repseller(t0)]
for each commodity type. The regulators and the
administrators can request to compute R(tn) and
Ttrader(tn) which will be stored in seller’s profile.
11) A seller is either penalised or rewarded based on the
associated trust values. Consumers of the commodities
can query Repsens, to check the temperature threshold
violations throughout the product chain. Other queries
regarding provenance, product chain and the seller’s rep-
utation can be invoked by administrators and regulators.
C. Performance Evaluation
The proof of concept implementation in Section IV-B is
evaluated using Caliper3, which is a benchmark tool that
evaluates the Hyperledger performance. It allows Hyperledger
users to measure the performance of a BC model using param-
eters such as latency and throughput. However, Caliper has a
limited set of predefined network models to choose from. For
TrustChain, we consider a base model of a solo orderer node
and the two endorsing peers from separate organizations with
one communication channel. The complete business network is
3https://www.hyperledger.org/projects/caliper
TABLE II
SECURITY ATTACKS
Attack Description Defence Attack Like-
lihood
Resistance
to Attack
Sensor Tampering An attacker/ dishonest trader tries to tamper the sensors so
that the sensors provide acceptable readings
We rely on the existing methods as provided in [16], [17], [18] for
tamper proofing the sensors
Possible High
Sensor feed modifica-
tion
An attacker tries to modify the sensor feed during communi-
cations
The sensor data can be encrypted with shared key between the sensor
device and the gateway.
Possible High
Whitewashing attack A dishonest trader tries to reset his poor trust score by re-
joining to the system with a new identity and obtaining
Trustmin.
a) The traders are registered to the permissioned network through a
central authority. b) In case of a revoked identity, traders can re-join
only if the network administrator allows.
Unlikely High
Sybil attack An attacker creates multiple identities (sybils) and tries to
exploit them in order to manipulate a reputation score.
Trader participants cannot create multiple identities Unlikely High
Ballot Stuffing attack:
Case1
A dishonest trader tries to generate false transactions with
himself in order to give high reputation to himself
A trader is restricted from trading with himself according to access
control restrictions
Unlikely High
Ballot Stuffing attack:
Case2
A dishonest trader colludes with other traders in order to
give high reputation score to himself by creating non-existent
commodities
a) Every trade is bound to a physical commodity, and the presence of
an invalid commodity can be detected as the product chain will not
be completed when the commodity is not traded b) The auditor of the
business network can detect a trader with multiple obsolete genesis
transactions and revoke the trader or lower his reputation score
Possible High
Bad Mouthing attack A trader, alone or colluding with other traders, tries to give
a negative feedback to an honest trader in order to lower his
reputation.
Our system includes a dissatisfaction flag for the buyer in case the
seller identifies a dishonest buyer. The dissatisfaction flag associated
with a trader can be monitored by the validators to identify dishonest
traders.
Possible Moderate
Impersonation and
reputation theft
A trader tries to acquire the identity of another trader and
steal his reputation.
Network registrations are refreshed by the business network admin
after a certain time which may require proof of identification.
Unlikely High
Repudiation of trans-
actions
A trader may deny a supply chain event that has happened or
supply chain data that has been produced
Transactions on BC ensure the immutability of data and the existence
of trade events as well as the source of the data
Unlikely High
modeled using Hyperledger Composer and performance tests
are carried out using Caliper tool on a Dell Notebook (Intel
Core i7, 2.21 GHz, 8 GB memory).
For the performance evaluations, we consider the Txcr and
Txtr transactions in TrustChain as they are not only frequent
but also their computational overhead is higher. We consider
a baseline BC system, without trust management, which only
stores ownership information of supply chain events. We then
provide a performance comparison of the TrustChain with the
baseline BC system by considering the Txtr transactions only.
To compute the overhead of our trust management system, we
use Txtr transactions, as these transactions invoke the rating
smart contracts for the trust management system.
Next, we present the throughput and latency performance
evaluations, where we vary the transaction send rate of Txcr
and Txtr from 10 to 100 transactions per second (tps) for a
simulation interval of 100 seconds. The evaluation results are
obtained by averaging 10 runs per send rate for each type of
transaction.
D. Throughput Performance of TrustChain
Throughput is defined as the rate at which transactions are
committed to the ledger after being issued from a trader.
Trade transactions: Txtr is the most expensive transaction
in TrustChain as it involves computing the Repseller along
with updating the ownership of a commodity. The through-
put comparison of Txtr in baseline BC and TrustChain are
shown in Figure 5. We observe that the additional overhead
introduced by the Trustchain is in the order of a few seconds,
resulting in the throughput of the baseline system being higher
by only 5 transactions at 70tps. Figure 5 also shows that the
throughput increases linearly as expected till it reaches the
maximum at around 40 tps and starts decreasing beyond this
point. This represents a saturation point for a validating peer
to handle the increasing transaction rate. This trend is similar
to a congestive collapse in network congestion, when after
Fig. 5. Comparison of average throughput
reaching a saturation point the network settles into a state
where it generates very low throughput, high packet loss and
an exponential increase in packet delays. The similar trend
is noted in the baseline system, where the throughput starts
decreasing around 40-50 tps.
Create transactions: Recall from Section III-B, that with
each TXcr, a new commodity is generated. Whereas, Txtr is
updating the status of already generated commodities and rep-
utation scores of participants. Thus, it excludes the validation
of new resources when an item is registered on the network.
For TXcr, Figure 7 shows that the increasing transaction send
rate throttles the validators around 35-40 tps, slightly earlier
than that in Txtr. This is most likely due to the additional
delay added by resource validation in Txcr, resulting in high
latency for Txcr which is detailed in the next section.
E. Latency Performance of TrustChain
Latency is the time taken from an application sending the
transaction to the time it is committed to the ledger by the
committing peer in Hyperledger. From [19], we deduce that the
transaction latency comprises of endorsement latency, broad-
cast latency, commit latency and ordering latency. Caliper
Fig. 6. Comparison of average latency
Fig. 7. Average throughput and latency
however provides only the cumulative delay and not a detailed
breakdown of the aforementioned components.
Figure 6 and 7 show the average latency for Txtr and
Txcr, respectively. It is noted from Figure 6, that the average
latency of TrustChain is slightly higher than the baseline.
Note that, for both transactions, when the transaction send rate
reaches above or close to the saturation point for maximum
throughput, the latency increases significantly. This is due to
the congestion caused by the rapid growth of the number of
ordered transactions waiting in the validation queue, which
affects the transaction committing latency; contributing to an
increase in the average latency. In case of Txcr, as the new
resource is being validated, the increased transaction send
rate throttles the validator, increasing delays i.e. transaction
endorsement latency. This affects the cumulative latency and
throughput slows down. Figure 7 shows that the throughput
of creating new commodities decreases to minimum as the
latency increases to its maximum.
Thus, depending upon transaction send rate in a particular
region of supply chain activity, we may need to distribute the
transaction load among an appropriate set of validators.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a trust management framework
for blockchain based supply chain applications to address the
issue of trust associated with the quality of commodities and
the entities logging data on the blockchain. TrustChain design
uses a consortium blockchain to track interactions among
supply chain participants and to dynamically assign trust and
reputation scores based on these interactions. The framework
also contributes in providing a reputation model which is
both agent and asset based, it can assign product-specific
reputations for the same participant, achieves automation and
efficiency using smart contracts. We performed a qualitative
security analysis with respect to threats in reputation systems.
Performance analysis of a proof of concept implementation
using Hyperledger showed that the additional overhead intro-
duced by Trustchain is minimal. In the future, we will explore
how the different network models pertaining to consortium
would affect the average throughput and latency of the system.
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